# Contract scan report

> **Automated scan, not an audit. Findings may be false positives; absence of findings does not mean the code is safe.**

- Scan id: `562e4139-a0c9-40ec-86e0-3c42d8df43f7`
- Status: **ok**
- Input: source, 1 file(s), 15 nSLOC, sha256 `6e5c7a0ec3f48388...`
- Compiler: solc 0.8.37
- Duration: 0.9 s

## Summary

| High | Medium | Low | Info |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

## Findings

### F-001 [MEDIUM] Chainlink latestRoundData without staleness or answer validation

`chainlink-stale-price` (custom) · confidence medium · `chainlink_stale_price.sol:17`

```solidity
        (, int256 answer, , , ) = feed.latestRoundData();
```

PriceConsumer.getPrice() (chainlink_stale_price.sol#16-19) calls latestRoundData without checking staleness (updatedAt) and answer > 0: (None,answer,None,None,None) = feed.latestRoundData() (chainlink_stale_price.sol#17)

**Why it matters:** The contract calls latestRoundData() on a Chainlink-style aggregator but does not check that updatedAt is recent (against block.timestamp and the feed's heartbeat), and/or does not check that the returned answer is positive. During oracle outages, network congestion or feed deprecation the call keeps returning the last (stale) price or zero, and the protocol then values collateral, mints or liquidates at a wrong price.

**Fix:** Require answer > 0 and block.timestamp - updatedAt <= heartbeat for that feed; on L2s also check the sequencer uptime feed. Revert or fall back to a secondary oracle when the checks fail.